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Abstract 
Declining fish stocks have led governments over the years to deploy traditional top-down 
measures in fisheries management. This top-down model is generally held responsible for the 
failure of fisheries management, attributed to the state’s ignorance of environmental effects 
of decisions and the lack of participation of the people affected. A way forward is perceived 
to be the common formulation of the problem and the design of its most adequate solution 
strategies in a policy-making process in which state, market and civil society play a 
significant role. In search for alternatives, Dutch government is increasingly deploying the 
instrument of covenants in fisheries management. We will use the Dutch case to analyse the 
role and function of covenants in fisheries management and seek to translate the Dutch 
experience to the wider European context of the EU Common Fisheries Policy. 
Introduction 
Declining fish stocks have led governments over the years to deploy traditional top-down 
measures which have led to an economic inefficient and overcapitalised fishery, a remaining 
pressure on the resource and a fisheries management system in crisis (van Hoof, et al. 2007; 
Raakjær 2008). The lack of legitimacy is often perceived in EU fisheries management as the 
factor leading to governments failing to effectively govern fisheries (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001; Hawkins 2005; Sissenwine and Symes 2007; Commission of 
the European Communities 2008). 
In the wider field of environmental politics we can notice a gradual shift in political 
participation triggered by criticism on the state regarding both its ignorance of environmental 
effects of decisions and the lack of participation of the people affected (van Tatenhove and 
Leroy 2003; Mol 2007). A decreasing centrality of the state as a political actor and an 
increasing interweaving of state, market and civil society, in which the common formulation 
of the problem and the design of its most adequate solution strategies are part of the policy-
making process, is perceived as the way forward (Arts and van Tatenhove 2004; Arts, et al. 
2006; van Tatenhove 2008; van Tatenhove and van Leeuwen 2009). 
The shift to more open forms of participative governance and the broadening of 
representation has in the last decade also become fashionable in the realm of fisheries 
management. Partly because of dissatisfaction with the performance of fisheries management 
systems across the world, partly because of the increasing interest in the notion of 
‘governance’ as a substitute for ‘government’ in a variety of policy sectors, and partly 
because of the growing popularity of the concept of stakeholder participation in all areas of 
governance and decision-making (Gray 2005). In fisheries governance this has resulted in a 
variety of new governance models and concepts that focus on interaction and participation, 
such as adaptive co-management (Armitage, et al. 2009) and interactive governance 
(Kooiman, et al. 2005). Interactive and participatory governance models depict governing 
systems as complex, heterogeneous networks, as political coalitions of more or less numerous 
and powerful stakeholder groups, who are partly internal and partly external to the system. 
Goals are not given ex ante and once and for all, but are relative to, and shift with, particular 
stakeholder compositions and interactions among stakeholder groups (Jentoft 2007). These 
models work on the assumption that each group has interests to defend and contributions to 
make and the negotiation of conflict and the building of compromise or consensus are central. 
Consequently, making policy is not so much about the exercise of authority as about political 
brokerage (Jentoft 2007). 
In Europe fisheries management traditionally takes place in a neo-corporatist arena. Social-
economic policies are jointly developed by government and representatives from the fisheries 
sector (van Hoof, et al. 2005; van Hoof 2010). This neo-corporatist foundation has provided 
for example in the Netherlands a stage for the development of a co-management system in 
the early 1990s, in which the fishing industry gained a significant role in the management of 
fishing quota. In addition we have witnessed over the past years the coming about of a new 
way of policy making in Dutch fisheries: covenants; a social contract between state, market 
and society on fisheries management. In this article we will use these Dutch experiences with 
the use of covenants in fisheries management to analyse the role and function of such 
covenants in fisheries management and seek to analyse their wider implication for fisheries 
management within the context of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The central 
question we will seek to answer is whether covenants can serve as an effective alternative for 
top-down fisheries management and provide an alternative institutional arrangement that can 
live up to the desired policy objective of an economic, ecological and social sustainable 
fisheries. 
The perspective we will take in this analysis is that from a government seeking to solve a 
particular fisheries management problem. This study is based on two sources of data. The 
first source consists of interviews conducted with governmental officials, sector 
representatives and representatives from the Environmental NGO (ENGO) community. The 
second source consist of literature on covenants and policy documents that were gathered and 
analysed. 
In the Theory of covenants section we will present a theoretical frame for the analysis of 
covenants. In the Covenants in Dutch fisheries management section we will present the three 
fisheries covenants developed in the Netherlands: the management of engine capacity in the 
cutter fleet, the North Sea cutter fisheries sustainable fisheries covenant and the mussel 
fisheries covenant. In the Analysing the character of Dutch fisheries covenants section we 
will analyse the role of these covenants in Dutch fisheries management and finally in the 
Discussion section we will discuss these findings and draw some conclusions. 
Theory of covenants 
In the first decades of modern environmental policy (1970–1990) environmental aims were 
translated into standards for products and production processes (Glasbergen 1998). After the 
1990s we can witness the transition from central management by means of coercion and 
incentives, via interactive management and internalisation (target group policy, covenants) 
towards self-control (Chappin, et al. 2009). In its basic form covenants are more or less 
formal agreements between a governmental organisation (usually a ministry) and a 
representative of the private sector (usually a sector organisation) with the intent of, on a 
voluntary basis, achieving national environmental policy aims (Glasbergen 1998). 
According to Korver and Oeij (2005) covenants are a form of soft law, such as declarations 
of intent, social contracts, ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ or simply ‘agreements’, in which the 
operationalisation and execution is delegated to social partners and organisations. Covenants 
usually are created and implemented in a process involving government, but in which the 
social partners take the actual lead in delivering the goods. The social partners regulate ‘how’ 
themes and issues of common concern can be tackled. As in most soft law, covenants tend to 
be procedural rather than substantive (Korver and Oeij 2005). 
The advantage for government to use a covenant, following Korver and Oeij (2005) is that 
covenants may compensate for the defects of traditional legislation, substituting for the 
declining power of ‘command and control’. With the covenant the government enlists the 
cooperation of non-public parties in order to achieve its goals. For the latter (for example 
companies and social partners) the advantage is an enhanced predictability of the behaviour 
of public authorities: by binding themselves, they also bind the government. Paradoxically, 
though legally unenforceable, the covenant guarantees the non-governmental parties a 
measure of legal security they would not otherwise have. Covenants are not like regular 
contracts, nor are they laws: they bind, yet not in a legal sense. Rather than prescribe, they 
create mutual commitment. They do not stress hierarchy, but emphasize reciprocal 
dependence, treating dependence not as a weakness to overcome, but as a model for 
discovering the advantages of cooperation (Korver and Oeij 2005). 
Over time the nature of covenants has changed. According to Glasbergen (1998) in a first 
phase, single issue voluntary agreements for specific environmental issues (such as waste 
management, water management and energy efficiency) or for a certain product were 
developed. Gradually these gave way to more complex ‘second-phase’ agreements, aimed at 
lowering the overall emissions of a sector of industry; they span a long period of time; and 
they call for a specific type of institutionalised co-operation between industry and 
government in which a consensual track (agreements on the basis of mutual trust) merges 
with the legal track (binding standards for products and production processes). In the third 
generation of negotiated agreements not only government and industry are involved but also 
the societal environmental concern, as represented by ENGOs, becomes part of the negotiated 
agreement. Hence a shift in government rule making from top-down policies towards more 
participatory policy development and from state centred towards constellations involving 
state, market and society. 
According to Bressers and de Bruijn (2005) several factors can contribute to the success of a 
covenant, such as the motive of the target group to join the covenant, the role of the covenant 
in the policy cycle and the wider set of policies in which the covenant is embedded. Target 
groups need to have a clear motive for joining the ‘voluntary’ negotiations (Bressers and de 
Bruijn 2005). This motivation, or ‘stick’, can have many forms. In some cases it is the 
government threatening to introduce tough regulations that drives industry to the negotiating 
table. In other cases it is public opinion that makes industry realise change is inevitable. 
Covenants are best used for dealing with problems that need further exploring before 
solutions are found (Bressers and de Bruijn 2005). If all partners know the precise measures 
to be taken beforehand, it is questionable whether direct regulation would not be a more 
efficient way to proceed; as negotiation processes can carry on for years the transaction costs 
involved in the negotiation processes before and after concluding the covenant are 
substantial. 
Covenants operate in a wider context of other policies and policy instruments. These other 
policy instruments can support the covenant, and vice versa, covenants need to be embedded 
in the policy system; direct regulation can deal with free-riders, subsidies can help lift 
technological barriers. The sole use of covenants will be less effective than the design of a 
complete package containing many instruments (Bressers and de Bruijn 2005). 
Focusing on the first two generations of covenants, signed between government and industry, 
according to Smit et al.(2008) two perspectives can be taken: a business oriented perspective 
and a public administration, or policy oriented, perspective. The business perspective 
provides insights in the rationale of (actors in) supply chains and networks of firms. The 
public administration perspective focuses on policy networks dealing with the various actors, 
their interests, and the influence they try to exert on each other as well as on the policy to be 
formulated. 
From the public administration perspective already two distinct uses of the covenant can be 
seen. Firstly, government can seek to deploy the instrument when top-down regulation fails. 
By reaching an agreement between government and sector the state has an agreement to 
which the industry will have to comply. In this State – Industry agreement, basically the 
phase one and two agreements as described by Glasbergen above, industry gains participation 
in setting the rules in exchange for compliance to the rules. 
Secondly, government can use the covenant as a tool for conflict resolution. In case a 
discussion between for example industry and ENGOs has reached a stalemate, the covenant 
can become a pivotal instrument in the negation process. What Bressers and de Bruijn (2005) 
refer to as using the covenants to deal with problems that need further exploring before 
solutions are found. Government persuades the quarrelling stakeholders to produce a path 
towards a solution and seeks agreement between market (industry) and society (ENGOs). 
From the business perspective, for the industry to sign up to a covenant opens ways to avoid 
regulation, respond to public pressure and reduce costs or gain access to public funds to 
finance a process of transition (confer Australian Packaging Covenant 2010). By signing a 
covenant, the parties indicate their awareness of the problem and their willingness to work 
toward a solution, demonstrating a sense of responsibility for the environment (Glasbergen 
1998). 
As the distinction between the business oriented perspective and the policy oriented 
perspective are based on the first two generations of covenants, signed between government 
and industry, the role of ENGOs is not directly addressed as ENGOs do not become direct 
covenant partners. The ENGOs exert pressure through the public opinion, seeking on the one 
hand to force government to introduce tough regulations driving industry to the negotiating 
table and simultaneously making industry realise change is inevitable (cf. Bressers and de 
Bruijn 2005; Smit et al. 2008). 
In the third generation of covenants the representatives of the societal concern (ENGOs) 
become signatory to the covenants. In for example the Netherlands the state actively seeks to 
change its role from a state ‘taking care of issues’ towards a state ‘facilitating issues to be 
resolved’.1 A way of implementing this was by inviting parties concerned (ENGOs and 
industry) to resolve (environmental) issues amongst themselves. Entering into the covenant 
enables the ENGOs to influence measures and policy implementation and influence the path 
towards a solution. In case there is a stalemate between quarrelling partners, the covenant 
offers to both industry and ENGOs a way forward (cf. Glasbergen 1998). In this ENGOs 
seemingly face a rather fundamental choice to either enter into the covenant and reach a 
compromise on a solution and see that something is done, or remain outside the covenant 
with the risk that the environmental issue is not addressed at all. 
Hence in order to understand covenants we will have to analyse the role and position of the 
parties involved and look at the scope and aims of the agreement reached. Examining the way 
in which the agreement is translated into a concrete plan of action and the way the covenant 
is intended to be monitored and evaluated will reveal whether the agreement is used as a tool 
for conflict resolution or as instrument to implement environmental policy. This will be 
reflected by the role of government in the process of the development of the covenant, 
together with the wider set of policy instruments deployed (financial support, policy 
measures), and the level of consensus reached between the signing partners. 
Covenants in Dutch fisheries management 
In a relative short period of time 3 covenants have been signed in the Netherlands between 
the fishing sector and government and, with the exception of one case, ENGOs. Following 
discussions between the Ministry responsible for fisheries
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 and representatives of the fishing 
sector in the mid-2000s steps were taken to address issues of engine capacity management 
and the wider sustainability of North Sea cutter fisheries. More recent the stalemate between 
the fisheries sector and ENGOs on mussel seed fisheries in the Wadden Sea has been 
addressed. 
Management of engine capacity 
In 1975 the European Commission limited engine capacity for vessels operating in the 12-
mile zone to a maximum of 300 Hp and a maximum 50 GRT (Gross Registered Tonnes). In 
the early 1980s the maximum of 50 GRT was traded for a maximum vessel length of 24 m. 
This resulted in the development of what later became known as the ‘Eurocutter’ fleet; a fleet 
of vessels operating in the coastal 12-mile zone with on average a length of 23.95 m 
(Hoefnagel 2007) but considerable larger than 50 GRT, in fact at times larger than 160 GRT. 
As this size of vessel could not be viably run on a 300 Hp engine the sector dodged the rules 
and installed engines with larger capacity. Breaking the rules at the time was quite easy as 
this period can be characterised as inadequate policing and enforcement by the Dutch state 
(van Ginkel 2005). 
By the end of the 1980s the engine capacity of the North Sea fleet operating outside the12-
mile zone was limited to 2.000 Hp. As both fleets operate a beam trawl, the catch success of 
such active gear is directly related to the engine capacity. The engine capacity determines the 
amount of netting that can be successfully towed and the speed at which can be fished. 
Despite a seal plan (in which engines were sealed, or locked, at a maximum capacity) and 
increased inspections during the 1990 and early 2000s, government did not manage to 
enforce the rules and increase compliance (Hoefnagel 2007). 
Following the introduction of an individual transferable fisheries quota system in the 
Netherlands in the 1980s a system of co-management was introduced in the 1990s. Groups of 
fishermen became responsible for the management of the quota uptake throughout the year. 
In the 2000s Dutch government, enthusiastic about the success of the co-management system 
and willing to embark on an increase of co-operation in more policy dossiers, sought the 
devolution of more (monitoring and control) tasks to the co-management system, such as the 
management of the engine capacity. This offer was turned down by the fishing sector. As 
stated by Ed Nijpels, chairman of the commission looking into a recalibration, extension and 
broadening of the co-management system, taking more responsibility was perceived as 
possible by the fishing sector but only if implemented under equal circumstances for all 
(North sea) fishermen (Nijpels 2003). Apparently the management of engine capacity in the 
co-management groups was at that time not perceived by the fishing sector as providing a 
benefit. The management of quota in the co-management groups clearly provided benefits for 
individual fishermen such as increased flexibility because quota could be transferred; it 
provided certainty to use the quota at the time they deem economically most rewarding; and 
the likelihood that others dodge the rules and regulations was decreased (van Ginkel 2005). 
Following the report of the Steering Committee Nijpels, the Minister had a series of what is 
commonly referred to as ‘fire place discussions’ with representatives of the fisheries sector 
during which the Minister conveyed his concern about the environmental sustainability of the 
beam trawl fisheries and the compliance of the sector. These discussions resulted in a joint 
statement in 2004. The Minister and the fisheries sector expressed their intention to establish 
a sustainable, viable and a social responsible cutter fisheries and their intent to embark on the 
required transition process (Anon. 2004). The fisheries sector would take responsibility to 
reduce the use of engines with a capacity larger than permitted in the fisheries license. It was 
felt that an approach in which the sector was involved in policing the capacity would result in 
increased compliance and thereby would be an effective addition to the public control (cf. De 
minister van Landbouw Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit 2008). This development fitted the 
overall political shift towards ‘less rules and more own accountability/responsibility’of 
societal partners and citizens. 
The ‘Werkgroep Motorvermogen’ (the engine capacity working group installed under the 
Nijpels committee) designed a private arrangement consisting of a framework of private 
inspections and sanctions. This arrangement became operational mid-2005 and was a 
voluntary arrangement to which 89% of the fishers signed up (Hoefnagel and van Mil 2008). 
Fishers that signed up limited their engine to the capacity as permitted in their fishing license. 
To allow for a transition period those that signed the agreement were allowed to, at the start 
of the campaign, have an Eurocutter with an engine capacity that could be no larger than 400 
Hp, after which it had to be reduced to a maximum of 300 Hp by 2009. For those that did not 
sign the agreement the engine capacity had to be brought in line with their fishing license 
immediately. Also the General Inspection Service of the Ministry (AID
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) performed random 
checks on 25% of those fishermen that had signed the arrangement; but a 100% inspection of 
those that did not sign. 
The same co-management groups that manage the quota uptake also manage the engine 
capacity programme. If an infringement is found by the group members the culprit will be 
fined. If an infringement is detected by the AID an immediate reduction of the engine 
capacity is required. In addition a fine is imposed by the management group as set in the 
group’s management rules. 
According to a preliminary evaluation of the arrangement both the AID, the Boards of the co-
management groups and fishers seem to be content with the implementation of the 
arrangement; no infringements have been detected and engine capacity is set at the levels as 
agreed. However, two aspects have become clear: as the arrangement next to self-control also 
aims at self-financing of the implementation, and since no infringements have been detected 
hence no fines collected, there is a financial deficit in the implementation of the arrangement. 
In addition, Board members of the fisheries groups experience a conflict of interest: on the 
one hand as enforcer of the public-private agreement they have to police their constituency, 
on the other hand they are promoter of the interest of the fishermen (De minister van 
Landbouw Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit 2008). 
North sea covenant 
In 2006 a Task Force Sustainable North Sea fisheries, established by the Ministry, consisting 
of representatives of the Ministry, the Dutch Fish Product Board, fisheries sector and market 
organisations, ENGOs, research institutions and fuelled by direct input from fishermen 
through a series of discussions, produced a report presenting the major challenges to reach 
sustainable fisheries on the North Sea (Task Force Duurzame Noordzeevisserij 2006). There 
were two reasons for the establishment of this task force. On the one hand the rapid increase 
in the oil price seriously affected the viability of the fleet, which had been already confronted 
with diminishing catch opportunities for a prolonged period of time (Task Force Duurzame 
Noordzeevisserij 2006). On the other hand, the societal acceptance of fisheries dwindled. 
Civil organisations, such as ENGOs, increasingly gained access to policy processes and were 
very critical of the sustainability of North Sea Beam Trawl fisheries. This is amplified by a 
development in the market where increasingly retailers, especially supermarkets, request 
guaranteed sustainable fish production. The report concludes that in order to achieve a viable 
and sustainable fisheries, state, market, societal organisations and science institutions should 
cooperate. It was explicitly suggested that a covenant should be signed between the sector 
and the most relevant ENGOs in order to regain the required societal acceptance of North Sea 
Fisheries. 
During 2007 fisheries organisations and ENGOs started discussions on the development of 
this North Sea Covenant. Early 2008 the Ministry was asked to join the deliberations and by 
June 2008 the North Sea Covenant was signed between the Ministry, two ENGOs, the Dutch 
Fish Product Board and 5 Fisheries Producers’ Organisations. The main agreements of the 
covenant were: 
• Obtaining MSC certification for a number of fisheries between 2009–2012 
• Improve communication on the sustainability of the sector 
• Sustainable fisheries should become an integral part of the fisheries educational 
curriculum 
• Embark on a joint process of establishing goals and measures for the establishment of 
Marine Protected Areas, operationalising NATURA 2000 and OSPAR agreements. 
• The management of flat fish stocks should result at stocks at Maximum Sustainable Yield 
level by 2015; a multi annual management plan, reduction of discards and a joint and 
transparent system of data collection and scientific support to policy should be developed. 
For each of these 5 elements of the covenant concrete tasks had been described for the state, 
industry and ENGOs. In order to facilitate the required transition process of the cutter 
fisheries and following one of the recommendations of the Task Force Sustainable North sea 
fisheries, government established a Fisheries Innovation Platform (FIP) which could finance 
initiatives towards a more sustainable fisheries. 
Monitoring of the process was agreed to be a joint activity and became part of a regular 
meeting (Groot Beheer Overleg, a semi-annual meeting of the main players from state, 
market and society; by the end of 2008 a separate meeting for covenant partners was 
established). The signing parties agreed that each of them was responsible for the 
implementation of the covenant and had a task in both promoting this covenant publically and 
create support for the covenant in one’s constituency. 
Mussel covenant 
In October 2008 the Minister signed a covenant with ENGOs and the mussel producers 
organisation to reach a transition in the mussel fisheries and restore nature in the Wadden Sea 
area. The signing of this covenant marked an end of a period commonly known as ‘the war 
on the Wadden Sea’: a prolonged legal battle in which licences granted to the mussel fishers 
were continuously challenged in court by the ENGO community. Twice a year fisherman 
from the Zeeland province in the South West of the Netherlands come to the Wadden Sea in 
the North to collect mussel seed which is then spread out on plots were the mussel seed 
grows to reach consumption size. Based on wild capture, in fact the mussel sector is the 
largest mariculture sector in the Netherlands. 
The Wadden Sea is a protected area, regulated under the Key Planning Decision Wadden Sea 
(PKB), the establishment of the State Nature Reserve Wadden Sea (falling under the Nature 
Protection Act), the Fisheries Act, the Flora and Fauna Act and the Interprovincial Policy 
Plan for the Wadden Sea (EcoMare 2009), next to EU regulation of Bird and Habitat 
directive, Natura 2000 area and the Water Directive. Ninety per cent of the Wadden Sea has 
been designated as a State Monument. Fishery activities must fit in with the nature protection 
policy. That means that the effects of the fisheries on the environment must be taken into 
account: the benthic life, the marine mammals and the food supply for birds. Undesired 
effects must be managed by limitation of fishing activity. In 2005 and 2008, the Council of 
State decided, based on a judicial procedure initiated by a number of ENGOs, that the 
Ministry unrightfully issued licenses to the mussel seed fisheries. The seed fisheries on wild 
banks contradicts the European Bird and Habitat Directive. The spring fishing in 2008 was 
consequently cancelled and the autumn fishing was being threatened. 
The judicial procedures frustrated further development and threatened the viability of the 
mussel sector. In order to reach a way out of these doldrums a commission was established 
by the Ministry which prepared the draft covenant, which was signed in October 2008 by the 
Minister, the Mussel Producers Organisation and four ENGOs. The ENGOs promised not to 
start any judicial procedure provided the mussel sector would do everything in its power to 
convert seed fishing and mussel cultivation into an environmental-friendly industry by 2020. 
The covenant states that the Wadden Sea is a nature conservation area in which human 
activities can be tolerated as long as they are not conflicting with the main goal of nature 
preservation. Also the covenant provides a period in which the mussel fisheries is allowed to 
embark on a transition process towards a more sustainable mussel seed harvesting technique. 
Early 2009 the covenant was translated into a plan of action defining concrete activities. Core 
of the plan is that by 2020 the traditional mussel seed fishery is banned from the Wadden Sea 
and is being replaced by a method not interfering with the bottom. In fact in 2009 already 
20% of the Wadden Sea was closed for mussel seed fisheries and annually this closure will be 
extended to a larger part of the Wadden Sea (Waddenzee 2009). The covenant at the same 
time stipulates that the transition process should allow for a viable operation of the sector. 
Noting the past volatile history of the conflict between fishers and conservationists it is not 
surprising that this covenant addresses explicitly the fact that implementation of the covenant 
is the task of all signing parties and that in case there is disagreement parties will not start a 
judicial procedure. Moreover, it is stated that the covenant cannot be legally enforced. 
Following the signing of the covenant a work plan was developed by early 2009 which 
provided concrete and detailed actions. Again specific roles and tasks were defined for 
government, the sector and the ENGOs. Main target is the progressive closing off of the 
Wadden Sea for bottom disturbing gear. This agreement between signing parties does have an 
effect on fisheries that are not part of this covenant such as the shrimp fisheries and static 
gear fisheries. The plan of action states that these actors should be included in the 
implementation of the plan. However, they are not part of the covenant signing parties. 
Monitoring of implementation is again a task for the signing parties. A detailed evaluation 
programme has been incorporated in the work plan, based on a monitoring and research plan. 
The covenant partners together decide upon research institutes that will fulfil the scientific 
role in the monitoring of the implementation and the effects it has on the ecosystem. 
The mussel covenant was severely put under pressure May 2009 as one of the ENGOs that 
was not signatory to the covenant (the ‘Faunabescherming’ (fauna protection) foundation) 
challenged the permit for mussel fisheries on the Wadden Sea in court. The Council of State 
ruled that a further limitation of the mussel fisheries was in order and reduced the permit as 
given by the Ministry for mussel fisheries on the Wadden Sea with an additional 25%. The 
Dutch House of Representatives, in debating the outcome of this procedure, queried the value 
of the instrument of covenants as apparently in judicial procedures any individual or 
organisation can claim to be stakeholder and challenge the agreement reached in the 
covenant, often after a lengthy process of seeking compromise (Tweede Kamer der Staten 
Generaal 2009). 
Analysing the character of Dutch fisheries covenants 
Over the last decade the Ministry developed the motto of ‘van zorgen voor naar zorgen dat’ 
(from taking care of towards enabling) which implies a shift in the position and role of 
government. Government seeks private initiative to reach policy goals, where before 
governmental rule making and enforcement were the preferred tools. In all the three Dutch 
fisheries management cases described above the government has opted for a voluntary 
agreement with industry to reach policy objectives. 
In order to understand the different covenants we will look at the scope and aims of the 
agreement reached, the way in which the agreement is translated into a concrete plan of 
action and the way the covenant is intended to be monitored and evaluated. Analysing the 
role of government, industry and ENGOs in the process of the development of the covenant, 
together with the wider set of policy instruments deployed (financial support, policy 
measures), will reveal the scope and intend for the use of a covenant. 
In the case of the engine capacity arrangement main government concern was to increase 
compliance with fisheries regulation. The existing rules and enforcement were not sufficient 
to bring about the required industry behaviour. In fact the rules were easy to dodge, rules 
were not effectively enforced and punishment was not felt to be restrictive (van Ginkel 2005). 
Fishers indicate that if punishment for excessive engine capacity would have been much 
stiffer (in the range of tying up vessels for a number of months and high fines) the rules 
would have been much more complied to (Hoefnagel 2007). The incentive to increase engine 
capacity is eminent in an active towed gear fisheries such as the beam trawl, in which engine 
capacity to a large extent determines catch success. 
Government tried for some time to get the industry to play a role in enforcement of these 
rules. Although at first turned down by the fishing sector, they later came to the negotiation 
table driven by economic concerns and societal pressure. Falling economic returns as a result 
of the prevailing high oil price which, as a side effect, induced a rationalisation of the use of 
fuel and hence engine capacity, was one of the drivers. In addition there was increasing 
pressure from society, ENGOs and the Minister to strive for a more sustainable production. 
As a result of the covenant compliance has increased based on a voluntary agreement but 
with the stick behind the door of inspections by the government control agency . 
The engine capacity state-industry agreement had a very clear path of implementation and 
specific rules for those individuals not signing up to the covenant. Implementation was 
monitored by the state and by way of external evaluation at three moments in time the impact 
of the regulation was appraised. The necessity for the sector to comply is felt; in the light of 
the wider sustainability discourse the sector perceives the need to change and the urgency to 
obtain a licence to produce. The agreement plays a role in opening the stalemate in which 
fishers point at each other for non-compliance; individuals were only inclined to change 
conduct when free rider behaviour was no longer tolerated. 
Whereas the engine capacity agreement is a bilateral state-industry agreement, the North Sea 
Covenant is a tripartite arrangement between state, industry and ENGOs. It aimed at 
obtaining a viable and sustainable fisheries sector within the boundaries of a healthy 
ecosystem, bringing the environmental concern and the economic concern together to obtain 
an implementation plan. From the industry’s perspective the sector is confronted with 
dwindling returns and a public opinion and market that demand sustainable fish production. 
In addition, the traditional neo-corporatist arena in which industry and government could 
negotiate policies is increasingly being influenced and invaded by public concern as 
expressed by ENGOs (de Vos and van Tatenhove 2011). By entering into the agreement the 
sector gained time, political support and resources (through the FIP and European subsidies 
of the European Fisheries Fund, EFF) to embark on a transition process. From a societal 
perspective the covenant brought about a process of necessary change in the fishing industry. 
In addition the covenant provided a stage on which environmental concerns and actions 
towards more sustainable production could be directly discussed with the fishing sector. 
From the point of view of the state the covenant created leeway for the industry to become 
sustainable in an environmental and economic sense yet simultaneously creates a sense of 
urgency to the industry to truly embark on this transition towards more sustainable 
production. The North Sea covenant and its consecutive work plan consisted of 5 themes on 
which agreement could be reached. It mainly consisted of the intention between the 
signatories to address an array of issues that need further operationalisation. 
Concerning the mussel covenant, from the perspective of government, the required transition 
of the mussel industry towards more sustainable production was hampered by mistrust and 
judicial processes between industry and ENGOs. In order to bring about a meaningful 
transition the stalemate caused by the “War on the Wadden Sea” needed to end. Government 
took a leading role in orchestrating the coming about of this covenant. Industry and ENGOs 
were persuaded to compromise in order to change the stalemate into a process of change in 
which both parties could seek to obtain their goals. The mussel covenant demonstrated these 
differences of opinion between the signing parties by having not one single objective but two 
main goals: the transition of the mussel fishing techniques to become more sustainable and 
the development of a Wadden Sea Nature Conservation plan. This covenant, in contrast to the 
other two arrangements, detailed quite an array of actions to be undertaken by government. 
For the industry the mussel covenant provided a platform to continue operation, a licence to 
produce, while simultaneously embarking on a transition process. For the ENGOs giving up 
their resistance provided them with a role in the process of transition of the sector and 
simultaneously created the development of a nature conservation programme, which stretches 
beyond fishing activities. For government it provided a basis for meaningful change, 
providing a way to obtain time for the sector to adjust the production process to be able to 
continue operating in a nature reserve and ending a routine were all the Minister’s decisions 
were challenged in court. The mussel covenant is the most clear example of use of a covenant 
as instrument for conflict regulation. It is also the covenant which depends to a large extent 
on outside independent (scientific) monitoring and evaluation. 
So far the engine capacity covenant is perceived to be successful with no infringements and 
vessels having adjusted engine capacity. The North Sea covenant has facilitated a process of 
transition and an array of initiatives have emerged under the FIP such as the development of 
new fishing technology (pulse trawl, reduction of fuel consumption), improved marketing 
initiatives and sharing of knowledge among fishers have been launched to support this 
process. The mussel covenant is put under pressure from parties not being signatory by 
contesting the agreement in court. 
From a business perspective the three covenants differ in scope, incentives and rational to 
sign up to this voluntary agreement. The engine capacity agreement provided the fisheries 
sector with a transition period in which it could adapt operating practices to already existing 
rules. The stick behind the door of government control and sanctioning, together with the 
carrot of industry self-control and a transition period for adjusting to the rules, provided an 
incentive for change. The North Sea covenant provided incentives for change towards more 
sustainable fishery practices against the stick behind the door of a required licence to produce 
based on public opinion on the use of marine resources and especially supermarkets, 
requesting guaranteed sustainable fish production. The mussel covenant provided the industry 
a way out of a deadlock on obtaining a fishing licence and hence allowed for continuation of 
business. 
From a business perspective the main conclusion is that for the industry the covenants 
provide an opportunity to adjust to a changing societal perception of sustainable use of the 
marine environment. The licence to produce, formerly literally provided by the state, was 
brought to question by a growing societal environmental concern. In order to maintain or 
regain a licence to produce, the covenants provided a tool for the sector to embark on more 
sustainable ways of production. At the same time it provided the industry with a say in the 
scope of the transition process. 
From a public administration perspective, the cases show that government can have different 
roles and positions in the (process of arriving at an agreement of a) covenant. The engine 
capacity covenant is close to what Glasbergen (1998) refers to as a first phase single issue 
agreement for a specific issue between state and industry. The state provided both stick 
(control and punishment) and carrot (transition period). In the North Sea covenant case 
government provided a carrot (funds and the FIP) and facilitated the process of industry and 
society conjointly developing a programme for more sustainable use of marine resources. In 
the mussel case the carrot provided by the state (a conservation plan for the Wadden Sea and 
a transition period for the mussel sector to reach sustainable operation) provided the leeway 
for industry and ENGOs to reach agreement on further use of the area for fisheries; hence 
government much more in the role of facilitator seeking to reduce conflict. 
From a public administration perspective two factors can be noted that influenced the state to 
seek to deploy the covenant as policy instrument. First, societal concern regarding sustainable 
use of marine resources increased over time, threatening the licence to produce of the fishing 
industry. Secondly, the state failed to implement at least some of its marine policy by using 
the more traditional state centred policy instruments. This resulted in what several authors 
describe as the shift in fisheries governance with the inclusion of a broader range of 
stakeholders and interactions (Kooiman, et al. 2005; Mahon, et al. 2010) in which various 
actors gain influence on each other and on the policy to be formulated. We see a 
repositioning of the state in relation to the actors from industry and society. The covenants 
are a manifestation of government negotiating fisheries policy in order to obtain a more 
sustainable use of marine resources. Of course, as mentioned above, the environmental angle 
of policy and the strive for a more sustainable production cannot be isolated from other 
factors such as the economic crisis in fisheries and the general criticism on the failure of 
government worldwide to properly manage fisheries. 
The degree of self-management differs between the three covenants. In the North Sea 
covenant and mussel covenant quite some opportunity can be found for the covenant partners 
to (re)define policy whereas under the engine capacity covenant policy is not renegotiated at 
all; in the end the industry will comply with prior existing regulation. 
Discussion 
In all of the 3 cases of Dutch fisheries covenants a form of joint problem solving can be 
found. In fact a large part of these covenants are about creating a process of change in which 
the fishing industry together with ENGOs define a transition towards a more sustainable 
production. Instead of opting for state regulations to bring about the transition, government 
opted for the use of a covenant, bringing together state, industry and societal concern to 
define and guide the transition process. In that sense a covenant is clearly a tool that reflects a 
repositioning of government: in dialogue with stakeholders, with at times different stakes and 
concerns, agreement is reached on (policy) goals and ways to achieve these. The covenant is 
an instrument with which parties from industry and society can directly influence government 
policy. 
The covenant takes the form of a social contract in which the signing parties agree upon the 
implementation of a work plan. Government is ultimately responsible for enforcement of 
implementation, but negotiations on goals and on implementation is transferred to the other 
actors and all signing parties can hold each other accountable for implementation. 
The three Dutch cases show that the instrument can be utilised by the state in three different 
ways. In the agreement on the management of engine capacity the government is using the 
instrument as tool for increased compliance to and enforcement of legislation. In the mussel 
covenant government uses the tool to pacify the nature conservation movement, which was 
obstructing policy implementation by taking all Ministerial decisions to court; the covenant 
serves as a conflict resolving measure. In the North Sea covenant government uses the input 
of civil society to persuade the fishing sector to embark on a more environmental sustainable 
mode of production. In fact it is public opinion that forces the fishing sector to the table; 
government positions itself as facilitator to embark on a transition action plan. 
Government can chose to be initiator of a covenant (engine capacity management) or can line 
up with public debate and facilitate the coming about of a social contract. Especially in those 
cases were state, market and civil society team up in a covenant the transparency, openness 
and accountability of the policy cycle is greatly enhanced. Hence, following Bressers and de 
Bruijn (2005), as a result the legitimacy of a covenant, as opposed to traditional top-down 
management, is much larger. 
The case study of the mussel covenant is illustrative of the scenario where the (increasing) 
regulation of resource use resulted in ever-increasing high transaction costs and eventually 
almost caused irreparable damage to the relation between the key actors involved. So, 
whereas Bressers and de Bruijn (2005) argue that covenants do not seem to be an efficient 
instrument if all partners know the precise measures to be taken, the instrument can still be 
deployed to increase acceptance of the measures. The implementation of legislation, 
especially in democratic settings with a high degree of consultation and mechanisms to 
challenge decisions, can bear such high transaction cost that in such situations covenants may 
be the more efficient way forward. 
The use of covenants also can be related to the complexity of the issue the state seeks to 
address and the limits to the governability of marine resource use. Limits to governability can 
be found in both the governing system and the system to be governed (Chuenpagdee, et al. 
2005; Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005; Jentoft 2007). Kooiman et al. (2005) argue that 
governability is shaped by diversity, complexity and dynamics of the (marine) system. To 
this can be added the vulnerability of the system (Jentoft 2007), the resilience of the system, 
the dependency of a community on fishing and fishing related activities and the flexibility of 
the community to deal with outside induced changes (Lindkvist 2000; Phillipson 2000; 
Symes 2000; Hatchard, et al. 2006; Hatchard, et al. 2007). Top-down management is 
perceived not to be adequate or capable anymore to govern fisheries effectively with a large 
complexity of the marine socio-ecological system – as there is no one single root cause 
problem to address but a complex system of causes and effects perhaps even stemming from 
outside the specific system. But it also relates to the perception that the existing knowledge of 
the functioning of ecosystem and social system may be less than sufficient, that proper 
management tools may be lacking, and some realms of the system-to-be-governed may be out 
of its reach if, for instance, the users resist interference in their activities (Jentoft, et al. 2007). 
This inability to govern would be a major cause for the failure of government to address the 
complex problems and would urge for opening up to more participative, inclusive and 
deliberative forms of management. 
The emergence of these more participative, inclusive and deliberative forms of management 
such as covenants as policy instrument may seem a logical development in Dutch fisheries as 
the fisheries was already managed under a form of co-management. The Netherlands are 
widely renowned for their ‘polder model; the corporatist arrangements that lie at the heart of 
the capitalist economies of the small Western European countries, in which a strive for 
negotiated consensus between government and industry is basis for conflict resolution 
(Tjiong 2005). In most of European fisheries management a form of neo-corporatism exists: a 
well-defined exchange relation between state, market and civil society actors in which 
policies are made and implemented jointly, based on a commonly agreed substantive 
discourse, in which the participating organisations are granted privileged influence on public 
policy-making in exchange for disciplining their constituency (the fishermen) and restraining 
their demands (Frouws and van Tatenhove 1993; van Hoof, et al. 2005). Hence governments 
across Europe already traditionally have an institutional setting in which agreements with the 
fisheries sector can be reached and hence covenants would fit this setting. 
With the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (Commission of the European 
Communities 2001) clearly the European Commission has embarked on a process of 
redefining the position of Member States, industry and stakeholders in the process of policy 
formulation. The establishment of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), following the 2002 
CFP reform, redefined the constellation of stakeholders involved in the CFP policy process, 
allowing industry and societal organisations to provide advice. In this vain of considering 
delegation of policies and overall an increase in participation in the policy process, an 
instrument such as joint policy development by way of covenants could play a role. 
The strive of the current reform of the CFP is, among others, to reach 
• a more simple and less costly policy with implementation closer to the people; 
• a decision-making system that encourages a more long term focus; 
• a framework that provides sufficient responsibility to the industry; 
• a reduction of the lack of political will to ensure compliance and poor compliance by the 
industry (Commission of the European Communities 2008; Commission of the European 
Communities 2009). 
From the Dutch experience with covenants we can draw the conclusion that covenants are a 
proper vehicle to increase the responsibility of the industry. With reduced infringements the 
implementation of policy becomes less costly and is brought much closer to the people. By 
including ENGOs in the agreement the political will to set more long term objectives and to 
ensure compliance can be increased. Covenants can provide a tool to bring together state, 
industry and societal concern in a constructive way, developing an agreement that fits with 
the local, regional circumstances, yet operating within a general framework of fisheries 
policy. 
Following the analysis of de Vos and colleagues (de Vos and Mol 2010; de Vos and van 
Tatenhove 2011) a covenant could enhance the building of trust relations between the 
government, industry and ENGO community. Hence, following Jentoft (2007) a covenant is 
not so much about the exercise of authority as it is about political brokerage. Covenants can 
effectively serve as an alternative for state top-down fisheries management. By allowing the 
fisheries sector to negotiate change with both government and ENGOs the covenants provide 
a useful alternative institutional arrangement that in fisheries management can help achieving 
an economically, ecologically and socially sustainable fisheries. 
Nodes: 
1
 A government slogan in the Netherlands past has been : van zorgen voor naar zorgen dat 
which freely translated states: moving from a state resolving problems towards a state that 
ensures that problems are solved, but not necessarily by government itself. 
2
 Currently the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, before known as 
the Ministry for Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries; in the remainder of this article we will 
refer to it as ‘the Ministry’. 
3
 Today the AID is renamed to nVWA, the new Food and Produce Authority 
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